**The Impact of Corruption on the Extensive and Intensive Margins of the Foreign Direct Investment**

by

Jingzhi Xu

An honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Science

Business and Economics Honors Program

NYU Shanghai

May 2022

Professor Marti G. Subrahmanyam Professor William Easterly

Professor Christina Wang

Professor Wendy Jin

Faculty Advisers Thesis Adviser

**Table of Contents**

[ABSTRACT 3](#_Toc103178042)

[I. Introduction 4](#_Toc103178043)

[II. Measurement of Corruption 5](#_Toc103178044)

[III. Literature Review 7](#_Toc103178045)

[*1.* *The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth and FDI* 7](#_Toc103178046)

[*2.* *The Method of Studying Corruption* 10](#_Toc103178047)

[IV. Methodology and Results 12](#_Toc103178048)

[*1.* *Model* 12](#_Toc103178049)

[*2.* *Data* 14](#_Toc103178050)

[*3.* *Model Specification and Results* 17](#_Toc103178051)

[V. Discussion and Conclusion 26](#_Toc103178052)

[References 27](#_Toc103178053)

[ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 30](#_Toc103178054)

# **ABSTRACT**

Although the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) has been studied quite extensively, little study has been done to analyze the difference between new investors and existing investors. By incorporating corruption into the gravity model of FDI and conducting a macro-level analysis with the data of U.S. FDI and affiliates in a large number of host countries, this paper shows that corruption has a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI (whether to invest) in the host country but does not have significant influence on the intensive margin (how much to invest). This result is more significant among developing host countries than developed ones.

**Keywords:** Corruption; Foreign direct investment; Extensive margin; Intensive margin

# **Introduction**

Africa’s economic development challenges raise an important issue about corruption worldwide. In the hardship of Africa’s economic development over the past decades, corruption is a major problem that has been concerned with prohibiting Africa’s growth. Rent-seeking, the culture of fraud, and bribery are common practices in many African countries. For example, there were persistent accusations of corruption in the use of aid to Ghana in the 1990s. In 1999, public servants were found to have embezzled more than 100 million cedis out of around 1.4 billion cedis of poverty reduction fund provided by the UNDP (*The Ghanaian Chronicle*, 2000). A lot of the political leaders and parties are corrupt and cannot deliver benefits to the people. In fact, the corrupt government officials and elites grasp a major part of the nations’ wealth, which prevents the accumulation of capital in productive industries. Also, domestic and foreign businesses are deterred from entering the market, fearing that the corruption will impair their benefits.

Among the wide range of corruption research, the study of the impact of corruption on foreign direct investment (FDI) is a rather important one and most study of how corruption impacts the foreign direct investment (FDI) has suggested a grabbing hand effect of corruption instead of a helping hand effect. Although it has been studied quite extensively, the difference between new investors and existing investors was not considered. Little study has been done to analyze the extensive (whether to invest) and intensive (how much to invest) margin of FDI separately. Going beyond the literature that studies its general effects on FDI, this paper explores more nuances: Does corruption influence the intensive margin in FDI and the extensive margin in FDI differently? The analysis shows that corruption has a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI in the destination country but does not have significant influence on the intensive margin. This result is more significant among developing host countries than developed ones.

In the second section, I introduce the different measurements of corruption. In the third section, I review the literature on corruption’s impact on FDI and the method of studying corruption. In the fourth section, I present my methodology, model, data collection, results, as well as the interpretation. In the last section, I conclude and discuss limitations of this study.

# **Measurement of Corruption**

In the past research on the effects of corruption, the measurement of corruption has always been difficult. Different types of measurement are developed in order to evaluate the magnitude of corruption for researchers, policymakers, and business people. Although there has been a revolution in the measurement, estimated levels of corruption are still heterogeneous, so consensus on its magnitude cannot be reached (Olken & Pande 2012). Different types of measurement have their own advantages and disadvantages, too.

 The first type of measurement is through direct measures, which rely on either official statistics or surveys on direct experience of corruption to collect evidence-based information. The official data is regarded as a reliable source for policymaking purposes due to its detailed information on corruption. However, it is not recommended to rely on it exclusively because many victims do not report and it at best only reflects the minimum level of corruption (Manual on Corruption Surveys 2018).

Experience-based survey data are widely used in literature. One of the important data sets is the International Crime Victims Survey measuring the direct experience of crime in different countries, including a focus on measuring bribery experiences (UNODC). It covers data of 49 countries till 2005. For firms, there are also World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. In the former dataset, each country has different years being covered, thus making it hard to compare and run regressions across time. The latter has the latest data in 2009, which is relatively old. One example is Svensson (2003), who uses the 1998 survey of Ugandan firms to examine how much they paid in bribes. Firms in the survey on average report bribe payments of about $88 per worker, or around 8% of the total costs. The advantages of experience-based survey data are that they overcome under-reporting problems of official statistics and allow comparability of data and disaggregation of information for different population groups. It is also easily replicable across counties. But the shortage is that the sample surveys focusing on bribery are not well calibrated to discover grand corruption or embezzlement. Most citizens have little contact with high-level officials and those who participate in corruption with such officials are unlikely to report them, even in anonymous surveys (Olken & Pande, 2012).

The second type of measurement is indirect measures. Since it is hard to measure the actual level of corruption, these measures are based on expert assessments or other types of surveys on the perceived level of corruption in one country. In fact, the perception-based measures are the most popular estimates of corruption and the basis of most cross-country corruption indices (Olken & Pande, 2012). The two most important datasets are Transparency International’s Annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Control of Corruption Index from World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI). The latter measure is a composite of many perception-based corruption indices. The Advantage of perception-based measures is their good coverage of cross-country and cross-time data. This makes it possible to study macro-level determinants and consequences of corruption in a large cross-section of countries (Svesson, 2003). But one shortage is that it suffers unpredictable sampling and reporting bias (Sequeira, 2012). Also, there is mixed evidence on the validity of perception-based measurement. Though Fisman and Miguel (2007) discover a positive correlation between being perceived as a corrupt country by the CPI and actual corrupt practices, Olken (2009) finds evidence proving that corruption perceptions may differ from actual practices, suggesting that perception-based indices may not accurately measure the actual corruption level and cannot be used as a proxy to estimate the actual levels of corruption.

The third major type is the measurement by subtraction. In this measure, the researcher obtains two measures of the same quantity: one measure before corruption happens and one measure afterward. The estimate of corruption will be the difference between the two measures (Olken & Pande, 2012). This study chooses to use the perception-based measurement due to its coverage of cross-country and cross-time datasets.

# **Literature Review**

Four features were identified in the literature: 1) there has been a debate on whether corruption has a positive or negative impact on economic activities; 2) most study has suggested a negative impact of corruption on FDI, while little study has considered the difference between new investors and existing investors; 3) there is a trend of moving from macro-level study of corruption to micro-level; 4) new efforts have been spent on experimental methods to study corruption.

## *The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth and FDI*

Generally, corruption has two kinds of effects, first, the distortionary effects on the allocation of resources which means the extent to which on-going economic activity is redirected and rendered less efficient, and second, the disincentive effects which means how much risk and uncertainty are introduced into the economic environment and thus deter prospective economic activities and, especially, investment (Goudie & Stasavage, 1998).

Some earlier research suggests positive effects of corruption on economic growth, like Nathaniel Leff (1964) who argues that corruption positively impacts investment because it speeds up the bureaucratic process and drives firms to increase efficiency when competing for higher bids, and non-economists like Samuel Huntington (1968) who point out that corruption is the grease for a rigid, over-centralized administration.However, these arguments are regarded fraught with problems as the distortion effects are not exogenous but within the system, delaying the bureaucratic process and decreasing allocational efficiency (Bardhan, 1997). Instead, the general consensus over academia and policymakers is corruption’s detrimental effects on economic growth.

In exploring the negative impacts, past literature has concentrated on how corruption impacts different types of economic activities. One group of literature focuses on corruption’s impact on investment. One of the earliest empirical studies was done by Paolo Mauro (1995), who shows that corruption can lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth. Later, there are more studies that prove the negative relationship between corruption and private investment (Mo, 2001) and foreign investment (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000; Zhu & Shi, 2019). Interestingly, corruption does not have a direct negative impact on public investment; rather, as Bardhan (1997) argues, it has a distortion effect that diverts public investment to less-detection activities or politicians’ private consumption, thus reducing profitability on productive investments relative to rent-seeking investments. Empirical studies find that corruption increases public investment while reducing its productivity, lowering expenditure on operations and maintenance and expenditure on health and education, and lowering the quality of public infrastructure (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997; Cavallo & Daude, 2011).

Most study of how corruption impacts the foreign direct investment (FDI) has suggested a grabbing hand effect of corruption instead of a helping hand effect. Hines (1995) observes that the U.S. FDI locates in less corrupt countries. Smarzynska and Wei (2000) uses firm‐level FDI in transition economies as evidence that suggests a negative impact of corruption on inward FDI flows. However, Abed and Davoodi (2000) were not able to prove this result in their study of per capita FDI inflows to transition economies between 1994 and 1998. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) uses a cross section of bilateral FDI flows to prove the negative effects of both the level of corruption and the absolute difference in the corruption level between the host and home countries on FDI. By analyzing data from 1983 to 1999, Egger and Winner (2006) found that corruption is an impediment of FDI in developed countries but not in less developed ones and demonstrated that the importance of corruption decreased over the years. Malesky & Samphantharak (2008) utilized a unique dataset of 500 firms in Cambodia and conducted a natural experiment, proving that the predictability of corruption can significantly lead to less investment by investors. Zhu & Shi (2019) found little evidence that corruption “greases the wheels of commerce” and suggested that the perceived benefits of predictable corruption are limited.

Although the impact of corruption on FDI has been studied quite extensively, the difference between new investors and existing investors was not considered. There has been little study that focuses on whether corruption influences extensive (whether to invest) and intensive (how much to invest) margin of FDI differently. Research on factors other than corruption that influence FDI has looked at this distinction. Ly-My and Lee (2019) studied the effect of aid for trade on both margins of greenfield FDI because they wanted to find out whether aid for trade not only increases the value of the FDI flows but also helps to diversify FDI flows by increasing the number of host countries and the number of projects in these countries. The diversification of FDI flows in new countries and in new projects is captured by the extensive margin of FDI. Davis et al. (2021) analyzed the impacts of taxes on the two margins of FDI by using firm-level cross-border investment data. They adopted a two-stage logit estimation, with the first stage being the probability to invest, and the second stage being the size of the investment.

The separation of two margins should also be adopted in studying corruption because for new investors who faces a new country and existing investors who have already set up their business, the influence of corruption on their investment decision may be different. A corrupt economy can be regarded unable to provide open and equal market access to every competitor. Bribery to the host country officials are not market value, thus raising the cost of entering the market. This can deter foreign new investors from starting a new business in this country. However, for existing investors who have already founded their business and been used to the bribery practice, it is possible that they can take advantage of the corruption to benefit its own business. In this case, the impact of corruption becomes blurry and even a possibly positive one to the size of FDI. Therefore, this research aims to fill the gap in literature and explore how may corruption influence the two margins differently. The hypothesis is that corruption has a negative effect on the extensive margin of FDI, whereas, it has a positive effect on the intensive margin.

## *The Method of Studying Corruption*

 From the earlier to the latest literature, there is a clear trend from focusing on macro-level to micro-level analysis. In the beginning, scholars approached the effects of corruption mainly from a macro level, using cross-country data to test the effects of corruption on the overall economic growth or other macro-level economic indicators. However, the major problem of running macro-level regressions is the endogeneity nature of corruption. That is, it can cause certain changes in economic growth but economic growth can also cause a change in the corruption level and practices. And finding credible instrumental variables for corruption at a macro level becomes difficult. Therefore, many studies switched their focus to searching for micro-level evidence by using within-country survey data and firm-level data. However, many of these studies still suffer from the inherent bias in measuring corruption through perception indexes, and the difficulty in proving causal effects when applying observational data that have endogeneity bias (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012).

Therefore, in the past two decades, there have been new efforts in applying experimental methods to the study of corruption. By employing field, lab, and natural experiments, scholars are able to overcome the constraints with measurement and the endogeneity problem. Till now, conventional lab experiments have studied, first, the micro-determinants of corruption with a focus on gender effects and cultural effects, and second, corruption deterrents, such as monitoring and punishment, whistle-blowing, and wage effects (Serra & Wantchekon, 2012). One of the earliest literature done by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002) studies whether the risk of detecting and punishing corrupt transactions influences bribing behavior.They developed the basic bribery game where three subjects are involved: a private firm (the briber), a public official (the bribee), and a third player representing the victim of corruption. In one treatment, it is impossible to detect corruption; in another, there is a 0.3% possibility of detection. They find that monitoring and punishment do have effects on deterring corruption. A lab experiment by Rivas (2008) find that women are less likely to initiate corruption than men, but not necessarily have more propensity to accept bribery.[[1]](#footnote-1) However, not many papers deal with the impact of corruption on investment through experiments. Among them, Zhu and Shi (2019) study the effect of corruption on FDI by leveraging a vignette experiment embedded in an original firm survey in China. They find that overseas investors always consider corruption detrimental.

Despite the progress on experimental methods to study corruption, it also has some problems with its external validity. To better improve the external validity, a more direct comparison between lab experiment results and those of other types of experiments is needed. And since currently, more experiments focus on bribery - one special type of corruption, how we can expand from “petty” corruption to “grand” corruption that influences economic activities as a whole remains an issue for more research to explore (Armantier & Boly 2012).

Considering the advantages and downsides of different methods, I use macro-level study to enable the usage of cross-country data, enhance the representation of a macro-level phenomenon, and prevent the external validity issue. But as said, there could be endogeneity bias as limitations.

# **Methodology and Results**

## *Model*

In this research, I used the gravity model of FDI, which has been widely used in FDI models (Kahouli & Maktouf 2015). The standard FDI gravity model is specified as:

Where Yi and Yj are the GDP of the origin country and the destination country; Dij is the geographical distance between the two; G is a constant. To incorporate the impact of corruption, I consider the following model:

Where Cj is the corruption level in the destination country. The intuition behind is that the more corruption there is in the destination country, the less likely that outside investors want to invest in this country. This intuition follows how most study has concluded. Now if we break down FDI ij into two margins, the hypothesized model should be the following:

Where Cj negatively influences the extensive margin and positively influences the intensive margin.

However, the standard gravity model only considers limited variables. In this research, I incorporate a broader model that contain more covariates that influence FDI based on the variables considered in Brada et al. (2019). Therefore, all the independent variables in the model are: 1) home country GDP, 2) host-country GDP, 3) host-country GDP per capita, 4) distance between most populated cities of the home country and the host country, 5) common official language (whether the home country and host country have common official or primary language), 6) hegemon relationship (whether the home country is current or former hegemon of the host country), 7) coverage of regional trade agreement.

 For dependent variables, I adopted the measurement used by Ly-My and Lee (2019) in their paper where the extensive margin and intensive margin are measured by the total counts of greenfield projects and the average dollar value of each project. Similarly, in this research, the extensive margin of FDI is measured by the number of foreign affiliates in the host country; the intensive margin of FDI is constructed by the FDI position (stocks) per affiliate per host country, that is, FDI position divided by the number of affiliates. The number of foreign affiliates captures whether there are more new investment and new business. According to OECD, FDI positions represent the value of the stock of direct investments held at the end of the reference period. Divided by the number of affiliates, it captures the size of the investment. I use FDI position rather than FDI flow because it can better reflect the size of investment made by foreign affiliates. Some of the stock can be financed by borrowing from home-country banks and investors, but flow data would miss counting this part (Brada et al. 2019). Also, stock data is less volatile than flow data and presents fewer zero and negative observations (Cezar and Escobar 2016).

## *Data*

I choose to look at the U.S. FDI data toward 160 countries from 2010 to 2019 and have the US as the home country because it has relatively more detailed datasets on FDI position and the number of foreign affiliates in the host countries. Also, since the US is the largest economy in the world, it has investments in most of the countries, making the dataset large enough to get reliable results. Datasets of FDI position abroad and the number of foreign affiliates abroad are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).

To measure corruption level, I use both the Control of Corruption data within the World Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by the World Bank and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International to run the same tests. WGI’s Control of Corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.[[2]](#footnote-2) CPI aggregates data from a number of different sources that provide perceptions by business people and country experts of the level of corruption in the public sector.[[3]](#footnote-3) The results by using both indexes will be reported. WGI and CPI are both standardized, each with a range from -2 to 2 and 0 to 100. The higher WGI or CPI is, the better governance the country has, meaning that the lower corruption it has (I will use the reverse WGI and CPI later in the analysis to indicate the level of corruption). One issue is that the pre-2012 CPI is not comparable over time due to the aggregation of information from multiple years by Transparency Intentional before 2012. Therefore, in the test by CPI, the time range is from 2012 to 2019. The GDP data of the US and all the host countries are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data for all the other covariates come from CEPII. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of number of affiliates, FDI position, and the corruption level (reverse WGI / CPI). Table 2 summarizes all the other covariates. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the corruption level of the host countries. Both indices follow the similar pattern where more countries cluster around the higher corruption level.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| VARIABLES | Year | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| Number of Foreign Affiliates |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2010 | 160 | 160.7 | 390.6 | 0 | 3,159 |
|  | 2011 | 160 | 164.0 | 396.6 | 0 | 3,208 |
|  | 2012 | 160 | 168.0 | 405.8 | 0 | 3,272 |
|  | 2013 | 160 | 169.6 | 407.8 | 0 | 3,280 |
|  | 2014 | 160 | 218.9 | 531.0 | 0 | 4,250 |
|  | 2015 | 160 | 221.2 | 537.5 | 0 | 4,315 |
|  | 2016 | 160 | 222.9 | 539.3 | 0 | 4,306 |
|  | 2017 | 160 | 224.2 | 541.8 | 0 | 4,309 |
|  | 2018 | 160 | 223.9 | 541.6 | 0 | 4,315 |
|  | 2019 | 160 | 246.7 | 589.5 | 0 | 4,681 |
| FDI Position in millions of dollars |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2010 | 139 | 24,965 | 75,470 | -199 | 514,689 |
|  | 2011 | 136 | 27,697 | 83,594 | -198 | 595,658 |
|  | 2012 | 139 | 29,503 | 91,139 | -59 | 647,365 |
|  | 2013 | 137 | 31,054 | 98,226 | -584 | 740,740 |
|  | 2014 | 140 | 33,476 | 108,300 | -64 | 753,546 |
|  | 2015 | 142 | 34,522 | 113,217 | -145 | 829,693 |
|  | 2016 | 141 | 36,605 | 120,714 | -164 | 816,667 |
|  | 2017 | 138 | 41,538 | 136,647 | -249 | 929,746 |
|  | 2018 | 138 | 39,322 | 126,603 | -202 | 809,663 |
|  | 2019 | 134 | 41,464 | 131,939 | -498 | 830,438 |
| Level of Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (WGI) | 2010 | 160 | -0.0278 | 1.033 | -2.359 | 1.673 |
|  | 2011 | 160 | -0.0247 | 1.027 | -2.404 | 1.587 |
|  | 2012 | 160 | -0.0283 | 1.023 | -2.381 | 1.524 |
|  | 2013 | 160 | -0.0353 | 1.021 | -2.405 | 1.594 |
|  | 2014 | 160 | -0.0207 | 1.005 | -2.253 | 1.773 |
|  | 2015 | 160 | -0.0287 | 1.004 | -2.276 | 1.766 |
|  | 2016 | 160 | -0.0301 | 1.004 | -2.284 | 1.806 |
|  | 2017 | 160 | -0.0184 | 0.995 | -2.241 | 1.826 |
|  | 2018 | 160 | -0.0272 | 0.991 | -2.213 | 1.638 |
|  | 2019 | 160 | -0.0305 | 0.994 | -2.170 | 1.723 |
| Level of Corruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (CPI) | 2012 | 146 | -44.84 | 19.92 | -90 | -8 |
|  | 2013 | 146 | -44.53 | 20.00 | -91 | -8 |
|  | 2014 | 144 | -45.26 | 19.87 | -92 | -12 |
|  | 2015 | 140 | -44.67 | 20.27 | -91 | -11 |
|  | 2016 | 146 | -44.85 | 19.43 | -90 | -14 |
|  | 2017 | 149 | -44.91 | 19.14 | -89 | -15 |
|  | 2018 | 149 | -44.97 | 19.26 | -88 | -14 |
|  | 2019 | 149 | -45.13 | 19.00 | -87 | -15 |

**Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Other Covariates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (Host Country) | 1,593 | 363.9 | 1084 | 0.16 | 14280 |
| GDP (USA) | 1,600 | 17960 | 2041 | 14990 | 21430 |
| Distance in km | 1,600 | 8,619 | 3,654 | 548.4 | 16,180 |
| Comlang\_off (dummy) | 1,600 | 0.306 | 0.461 | 0 | 1 |
| Hegemon (dummy) | 1,600 | 0.025 | 0.156 | 0 | 1 |
| GDP Per Capita in current thousands dollars (Host Country) | 1,574 | 15.75 | 20.92 | 0.226 | 119.2 |
| RTA\_Coverage (dummy) | 1,600 | 0.121 | 0.327 | 0 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

 

**Figure 1. Distribution of the Corruption Level of the Host Countries**

## *Model Specification and Results*

Following the extended gravity model, I used linear specification by taking the log of the non-dummy variables on each side of the equation. Since both corruption indices are standardized, the data should already have the features of the log form of actual corruption level in reality. Therefore, the corruption term does not have the log form in the model specification. Since some of the number of affiliations are zero, I add one to all the data before I take the log so that all the observations can be kept. But for the term Log (FDI/Affiliation Number), I choose not to do any transformation because by adding constant on either the numerator or the denominator will change the scale. The model is specified as the following.

(1) Pooled OLS:

*Log(Affiliation Number) = + + + + + + + + +*

*Log(FDI/Affiliation Number) = + + + + + + + + +*

(2) Fixed Effect:

*Log(Affiliation Number) = + + + + + +*

*Log(FDI/Affiliation Number) = + + + + + +*

Here, represent cross-country fixed effect. When CPI is used, I also add a term, *,* in both OLS and fixed effect models to capture the time fixed effect because there may be global trends contained in the CPI index. The results of using WGI are presented in Table 3 and the results by CPI are presented in Table 4.

To interpret this result, we see that the coefficients of corruption in the model to the number of affiliates, i.e. the extensive margin, are negative, meaning that the higher corruption is, the fewer affiliates will be in the host country. This negative relationship is significant when using both indices to estimate in OLS method. It is significant in the fixed effect model with the CPI index but not with the WGI index. Whereas, the coefficient of corruption in the model to the intensive margin of FDI is positive by using both indices and both OLS and fixed effect estimation even though they are not significant. But note that the standard errors of these results on the intensive margin lead to the confidence interval lying cross the zero point, which means it is possible that the effect is zero or negative. This means that it is likely that the higher corruption is, the more average FDI there will be, but this effect is not significant and may be negative. This comparison is interesting and partly aligns with the hypothesis. Corruption negatively impacts the extensive margin, that is, whether investors want to start a new business in the destination country; whereas, corruption does not matter that much for the existing investors’ decision to continue investing in this country and may even positively drives more investment. To interpret it a step further, this result means that corruption mainly blocks investors’ incentives to enter the market, but doesn’t prevent existing investors to continue their investment or make use of the corrupt environment to invest more.

Even though significant results are observed for the impact of corruption on the extensive margin of FDI, the magnitude of coefficient seems very small. For instance, by using the CPI index, the fixed-effect model result shows that one score decrease in the corruption level will only lead to about 0.776% increase in the number of affiliates. However, if a country can actually reduce its corruption level to a certain degree, the influence on attracting more new investors to start business should not be neglected. Take Argentina as an example, its CPI index increased from 35 to 45 from 2012 to 2019, i.e. the corruption level in Argentina decreased by 10 scores. Accordingly, the number of U.S. affiliates in Argentina increased from 247 to 300 over the same period. This 21.5% increase in the extensive margin of U.S. FDI in Argentina could partly be attributed by the lowered corruption level.

**Table 3. Corruption and Both Margins of FDI (WGI)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Y = Number of Affiliates | FDI Position / Number of Affiliates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | OLS | Fixed Effect | OLS | Fixed Effect |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| corruption | -0.311\*\*\* | -0.000852 | 0.0549 | 0.119 |
|  | (0.0382) | (0.0500) | (0.0523) | (0.115) |
| log\_gdp\_USA | 0.00356\* | 0.00805\*\*\* | -0.00748\*\*\* | -0.00557\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00187) | (0.000652) | (0.00257) | (0.00133) |
| log\_gdp | 0.739\*\*\* | -0.104 | 0.196\*\*\* | -0.174 |
|  | (0.0131) | (0.0932) | (0.0179) | (0.204) |
| log\_gdpcap\_d | 0.219\*\*\* | 0.406\*\*\* | 0.374\*\*\* | 0.825\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0314) | (0.0849) | (0.0452) | (0.189) |
| log\_dist | -0.627\*\*\* |  | -0.121\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0525) |  | (0.0577) |  |
| comlang\_off | 0.641\*\*\* |  | 0.582\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0562) |  | (0.0747) |  |
| heg\_o | 1.842\*\*\* |  | 0.329 |  |
|  | (0.271) |  | (0.268) |  |
| rta | 0.271\*\*\* |  | 0.267\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0555) |  | (0.0650) |  |
| log\_pop |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -10.03\*\*\* | 4.903\*\* | -1.108\* | 6.333 |
|  | (0.509) | (2.155) | (0.632) | (4.784) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,573 | 1,573 | 1,203 | 1,203 |
| R-squared | 0.819 | 0.173 | 0.330 | 0.052 |
| Number of Country |  | 160 |  | 151 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4. Corruption and Both Margins of FDI (CPI)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Y = Number of Affiliates | FDI Position / Number of Affiliates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | OLS | Fixed Effect | OLS | Fixed Effect |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| corruption | -0.0168\*\*\* | -0.00776\*\*\* | 0.00284 | 0.00895 |
|  | (0.00229) | (0.00269) | (0.00311) | (0.00557) |
| log\_gdp\_USA | 1.074\*\*\* | 1.638\*\*\* | -1.374\*\*\* | -1.635\*\*\* |
|  | (0.362) | (0.100) | (0.488) | (0.205) |
| log\_gdp | 0.750\*\*\* | -0.509\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.627\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0165) | (0.101) | (0.0221) | (0.238) |
| log\_gdpcap\_d | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.552\*\*\* | 0.378\*\*\* | 0.261 |
|  | (0.0391) | (0.0852) | (0.0543) | (0.204) |
| log\_dist | -0.540\*\*\* |  | -0.109\* |  |
|  | (0.0583) |  | (0.0652) |  |
| comlang\_off | 0.619\*\*\* |  | 0.642\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0629) |  | (0.0862) |  |
| heg\_o | 1.156\*\*\* |  | -0.770\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.247) |  | (0.280) |  |
| rta | 0.314\*\*\* |  | 0.267\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0590) |  | (0.0727) |  |
| 2013.year | -0.0586 | -0.0263 | -0.0136 | 0.00583 |
|  | (0.0999) | (0.0248) | (0.128) | (0.0508) |
| 2014.year | 0.102 | 0.146\*\*\* | -0.158 | -0.119\*\* |
|  | (0.0903) | (0.0238) | (0.122) | (0.0477) |
| 2015.year | 0.107 | 0.0855\*\*\* | -0.205\* | -0.0656 |
|  | (0.0884) | (0.0238) | (0.122) | (0.0475) |
| 2016.year | 0.131 | 0.0899\*\*\* | -0.111 | 0.0148 |
|  | (0.0857) | (0.0238) | (0.118) | (0.0469) |
| 2017.year | 0.0215 | -0.00177 | -0.0232 | 0.0505 |
|  | (0.0860) | (0.0232) | (0.115) | (0.0460) |
| 2018.year | -0.111 | -0.0959\*\*\* | 0.0598 | 0.0964\*\* |
|  | (0.0920) | (0.0245) | (0.129) | (0.0482) |
| 2019o.year | - | - | - | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -44.59\*\*\* | -35.26\*\*\* | 40.89\*\*\* | 37.48\*\*\* |
|  | (11.10) | (3.274) | (14.91) | (6.998) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,154 | 1,154 | 920 | 920 |
| R-squared | 0.835 | 0.333 | 0.354 | 0.134 |
| Number of Country |  | 149 |  | 137 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Further, I check the results by dividing the host countries into developed countries and developing countries to see whether the same effect of corruption apply to both groups.[[4]](#footnote-4) The results are presented below in Table 5, 6, 7, and 8. It is found that the results are not as significant for developed host countries but are more significant for developing host countries. With WGI index for developed host countries, corruption has no significant effect on either of the FDI margin, even though the sign of the coefficient follows what is estimated for all host countries. With WGI for developing economies, corruption has significant negative effect on the extensive margin by the OLS model but no significant effect on the intensive margin. With CPI index for developed countries, corruption is tested to have no significant impact on the extensive margin but have significant positive impact on the intensive margin by fixed effect model. With CPI for developing countries, corruption is tested to have significant negative impact on the extensive margin by both the OLS model and the fixed effect model but does not have significant impact on intensive margin, which exactly follows the results from the all-country estimation.

**Table 5. Results for Developed Countries (WGI)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Y = Number of Affiliates | FDI Position / Number of Affiliates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | OLS | Fixed Effect | OLS | Fixed Effect |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| corruption | -0.0433 | -0.121 | 0.0731 | 0.185 |
|  | (0.0616) | (0.0966) | (0.0965) | (0.214) |
| log\_gdp\_USA | 0.00535\*\* | 0.00635\*\*\* | 2.12e-05 | -0.00123 |
|  | (0.00248) | (0.000803) | (0.00327) | (0.00184) |
| log\_gdp | 0.988\*\*\* | 1.314\*\*\* | 0.249\*\*\* | 0.158 |
|  | (0.0279) | (0.413) | (0.0261) | (0.931) |
| log\_gdpcap\_d | 0.427\*\*\* | -0.871\*\* | 1.531\*\*\* | 0.835 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.436) | (0.120) | (0.976) |
| log\_dist | -0.353\*\*\* |  | -0.110\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0457) |  | (0.0297) |  |
| comlang\_off | 0.981\*\*\* |  | 0.898\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0844) |  | (0.101) |  |
| o.heg\_o | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| rta | -0.773\*\*\* |  | -0.437\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0868) |  | (0.100) |  |
| Constant | -19.68\*\*\* | -26.74\*\*\* | -7.348\*\*\* | -2.940 |
|  | (0.837) | (9.510) | (0.847) | (21.65) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 268 | 268 | 248 | 248 |
| R-squared | 0.921 | 0.368 | 0.736 | 0.087 |
| Number of Country |  | 27 |  | 27 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 6. Results for Developing Countries (WGI)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Y = Number of Affiliates | FDI Position / Number of Affiliates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | OLS | Fixed Effect | OLS | Fixed Effect |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| corruption | -0.456\*\*\* | 0.00989 | -0.0417 | 0.115 |
|  | (0.0522) | (0.0558) | (0.0717) | (0.133) |
| log\_gdp\_USA | 0.00291 | 0.00825\*\*\* | -0.00850\*\*\* | -0.00694\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00209) | (0.000786) | (0.00292) | (0.00167) |
| log\_gdp | 0.746\*\*\* | -0.138 | 0.218\*\*\* | -0.143 |
|  | (0.0149) | (0.103) | (0.0217) | (0.227) |
| log\_gdpcap\_d | 0.196\*\*\* | 0.411\*\*\* | 0.373\*\*\* | 0.800\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0338) | (0.0914) | (0.0491) | (0.204) |
| log\_dist | -0.744\*\*\* |  | -0.206\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0564) |  | (0.0803) |  |
| comlang\_off | 0.573\*\*\* |  | 0.478\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0658) |  | (0.0955) |  |
| heg\_o | 1.921\*\*\* |  | 0.410 |  |
|  | (0.271) |  | (0.281) |  |
| rta | 0.278\*\*\* |  | 0.178\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0679) |  | (0.0834) |  |
| Constant | -9.000\*\*\* | 5.375\*\* | -0.721 | 5.725 |
|  | (0.542) | (2.361) | (0.714) | (5.291) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,303 | 1,303 | 955 | 955 |
| R-squared | 0.759 | 0.160 | 0.288 | 0.054 |
| Number of Country |  | 133 |  | 124 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 7. Results for Developed Countries (CPI)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Y = Number of Affiliates | FDI Position / Number of Affiliates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | OLS | Fixed Effect | OLS | Fixed Effect |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| corruption | -0.000856 | 0.00394 | 0.00825 | 0.0280\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00350) | (0.00352) | (0.00565) | (0.00959) |
| log\_gdp\_USA | 0.893\* | 1.387\*\*\* | -1.249\* | -1.654\*\*\* |
|  | (0.495) | (0.109) | (0.676) | (0.302) |
| log\_gdp | 0.995\*\*\* | -1.135\*\*\* | 0.224\*\*\* | 3.869\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0316) | (0.397) | (0.0280) | (1.149) |
| log\_gdpcap\_d | 0.478\*\*\* | 1.597\*\*\* | 1.642\*\*\* | -2.951\*\* |
|  | (0.132) | (0.408) | (0.124) | (1.186) |
| log\_dist | -0.358\*\*\* |  | -0.130\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0465) |  | (0.0344) |  |
| comlang\_off | 0.953\*\*\* |  | 0.876\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0921) |  | (0.103) |  |
| o.heg\_o | - |  | - |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| rta | -0.765\*\*\* |  | -0.459\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0907) |  | (0.106) |  |
| 2013.year | -0.102 | -0.0732\*\*\* | 0.0570 | 0.0112 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.0254) | (0.160) | (0.0711) |
| 2014.year | 0.0621 | 0.0932\*\*\* | -0.0352 | -0.0682 |
|  | (0.124) | (0.0242) | (0.142) | (0.0657) |
| 2015.year | 0.205\* | 0.110\*\*\* | 0.207 | 0.0938 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.0263) | (0.151) | (0.0746) |
| 2016.year | 0.167 | 0.0888\*\*\* | 0.258\* | 0.125\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.0256) | (0.143) | (0.0727) |
| 2017.year | 0.0424 | 0.00249 | 0.202 | 0.184\*\*\* |
|  | (0.117) | (0.0240) | (0.155) | (0.0643) |
| 2018.year | -0.109 | -0.0875\*\*\* | 0.0803 | 0.128\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.0253) | (0.175) | (0.0665) |
| 2019o.year | - | - | - | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -47.14\*\*\* | -12.05 | 31.68 | -36.67 |
|  | (15.17) | (8.337) | (20.67) | (23.81) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 216 | 216 | 202 | 202 |
| R-squared | 0.926 | 0.682 | 0.751 | 0.267 |
| Number of Country |  | 27 |  | 27 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 8. Results for Developing Countries (CPI)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Y = Number of Affiliates | FDI Position / Number of Affiliates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| VARIABLES | OLS | Fixed Effect | OLS | Fixed Effect |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| corruption | -0.0257\*\*\* | -0.00930\*\*\* | -0.00263 | 0.00556 |
|  | (0.00318) | (0.00316) | (0.00426) | (0.00665) |
| log\_gdp\_USA | 1.082\*\*\* | 1.719\*\*\* | -1.331\*\* | -1.728\*\*\* |
|  | (0.414) | (0.121) | (0.552) | (0.253) |
| log\_gdp | 0.752\*\*\* | -0.553\*\*\* | 0.204\*\*\* | 0.609\*\* |
|  | (0.0188) | (0.113) | (0.0272) | (0.263) |
| log\_gdpcap\_d | 0.196\*\*\* | 0.558\*\*\* | 0.379\*\*\* | 0.310 |
|  | (0.0428) | (0.0933) | (0.0595) | (0.222) |
| log\_dist | -0.683\*\*\* |  | -0.210\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0651) |  | (0.0979) |  |
| comlang\_off | 0.562\*\*\* |  | 0.553\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0754) |  | (0.110) |  |
| heg\_o | 1.243\*\*\* |  | -0.739\*\* |  |
|  | (0.251) |  | (0.289) |  |
| rta | 0.300\*\*\* |  | 0.178\* |  |
|  | (0.0741) |  | (0.0913) |  |
| 2013.year | -0.0476 | -0.0160 | -0.0480 | 0.000657 |
|  | (0.113) | (0.0299) | (0.150) | (0.0616) |
| 2014.year | 0.107 | 0.157\*\*\* | -0.183 | -0.134\*\* |
|  | (0.102) | (0.0287) | (0.144) | (0.0580) |
| 2015.year | 0.112 | 0.0928\*\*\* | -0.245\* | -0.108\* |
|  | (0.101) | (0.0287) | (0.145) | (0.0577) |
| 2016.year | 0.135 | 0.101\*\*\* | -0.148 | -0.0166 |
|  | (0.0968) | (0.0287) | (0.138) | (0.0570) |
| 2017.year | 0.0259 | -9.78e-05 | -0.0510 | 0.0191 |
|  | (0.0979) | (0.0278) | (0.132) | (0.0561) |
| 2018.year | -0.108 | -0.0997\*\*\* | 0.0534 | 0.0905 |
|  | (0.106) | (0.0295) | (0.146) | (0.0588) |
| 2019o.year | - | - | - | - |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -43.85\*\*\* | -37.15\*\*\* | 40.01\*\* | 40.72\*\*\* |
|  | (12.68) | (3.836) | (16.85) | (8.188) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 938 | 938 | 718 | 718 |
| R-squared | 0.783 | 0.313 | 0.305 | 0.137 |
| Number of Country |  | 122 |  | 110 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# **Discussion and Conclusion**

This paper incorporates corruption into the gravity model of FDI and separately tests the effect of corruption on the extensive margin and the intensive margin of FDI using the U.S. FDI and affiliates data. The results have shown that corruption has a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI in the destination country but does not have significant influence on the intensive margin. In another word, corruption mainly blocks new investors’ incentives to enter the market, but does not matter that much for existing investors or prevent them to make use of the corrupt environment and invest more. This result is not as significant for developed host countries but are more significant for developing host countries. This suggests that the influence of corruption in developed countries are very small but still matter in developing host countries. For policymakers in developing countries, it becomes important to improve their political and economic institution and decrease their corruption level in order to attract more new foreign investors. For investors who are thinking to invest in a new country, this study shows that the corruption level could still be a great concern. In general, this paper contributes to the literature by separating the FDI into two difference margins

 Since this study used the U.S. FDI and affiliates data, there could be limitation in representing investors in other countries. Future study can expand the dataset for home countries to increase the variability. Also, since this study is a macro-level cross-country one, future research can further explore in a micro-level approach, that is, to collect firm-level data or conduct surveys to firm decision makers.

# **REFERENCES**

Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2002). An experimental bribery game. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 18(2), 428–454.

Abed, George T., and Hamid R. Davoodi. 2000. “Corruption, Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance in the Transition Economies.” IMF Working Paper no. 00/132, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2012), "Chapter 5 On the External Validity of Laboratory Experiments on Corruption", Serra, D. and Wantchekon, L. (Ed.) *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption* (*Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 15*), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 117-144.

Bardhan, Pranab. “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Sep. 1997, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 1320- 1346

Beata K. and Smarzynska Sbhang-JinWei. Corruption and the Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence. *The World Bank Development Research Group Trade And Public Economics*, 2000.

Brada, J. C., Drabek, Z., Mendez, J. A., & Perez, M. F. (2019). National levels of corruption and foreign direct investment. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *47*(1), 31-49.

Cavallo, Eduardo and Christian Daude. Public investment in developing countries: A blessing or a curse? *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39 (2011) 65–81.

Cezar, R., & Escobar, O. R. (2015). Institutional distance and foreign direct investment. Review of World Economics, 151(4), 713-733.

Davies, R. B., Siedschlag, I., & Studnicka, Z. (2021). The impact of taxes on the extensive and intensive margins of FDI. International Tax and Public Finance, 28(2), 434-464.

Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2006). How corruption influences foreign direct investment: A panel data study. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(2), 459-486.

Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115, 1020–1048.

Goudie, A.W. and David Stasavage. “A Framework of the Analysis of Corruption”. *Crime, Law & Social Change* 29: 113–159, 1998.

Hines, James R. 1995. “Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977.” NBER Working Paper no. 5266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1968.

Kahouli, B., & Maktouf, S. (2015). The determinants of FDI and the impact of the economic crisis on the implementation of RTAs: A static and dynamic gravity model. *International Business Review*, *24*(3), 518-529.

Leff, Nathaniel H. (1964). “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption”. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 8(3), 8–14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000276426400800303>

Ly‐My, D., & Lee, H. H. (2019). Effects of aid for trade on extensive and intensive margins of greenfield FDI. The World Economy, 42(7), 2120-2143.

Malesky E and Samphantharak K. 2008. Predictable corruption and firm investment: evidence from a natural experiment and survey of Cambodian entrepreneurs. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 3:227–67.

Manual on Corruption Surveys (UNODC, UNDP and UNODC-INEGI, 2018, pp. 20-29). <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/CorruptionManual_2018_web.pdf>

Mauro, Paolo (1995). “Corruption and Growth,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110 (3), 681-712.

Mo, P. H. (2001). Corruption and economic growth. *Journal of comparative economics*, *29*(1), 66-79.

Olken, Benjamin. “Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality”. *Journal of Public Economics*, 2009, vol. 93, issue 7-8, 950-964

Olken, Benjamin A. and Rohini Pande. “Corruption in Developing Countries”. *Annual Review of Economics*. 2012. 4:479–509.

Pranab Bardhan. “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”. *Journal of Economic Literature, Sep. 1997, Vol. 35, No. 3* (Sep., 1997), pp. 1320- 1346

Rivas, M. F. (2013). An experiment on corruption and gender. *Bulletin of Economic Research*, *65*(1), 10-42.

Sequeira, S. (2012), "Chapter 6 Advances in Measuring Corruption in the Field", Serra, D. and Wantchekon, L. (Ed.) *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption* (*Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 15*), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 145-175.

Serra, D. and Wantchekon, L. (2012), "Chapter 1 Experimental Research on Corruption: Introduction and Overview", Serra, D. and Wantchekon, L. (Ed.) *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 15)*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 1-11.

Smarzynska, Beata K. and Sbhang-Jin Wei. Corruption and the Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence. The World Bank Development Research Group Trade and Public Economics, 2000.

Svensson, J. (2003). Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *118*(1), 207–230.

*The Ghanaian Chronicle*, July 3-4, 2000, p.8

Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. “Corruption, Public Investment and Growth”. *IMF Working Paper* No.WP/97/139, 1997.

Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index.

United Nations of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “University Module Series: Anti-Corruption Module”,<https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/anti-corruption/module-1/key-issues/measuring-corruption.html>

World Bank. World Governance Indicators.

Zhu, Boliang and Weiyi Shi. Greasing the Wheels of Commerce? Corruption and Foreign Investment. *The Journal of Politics*, volume 81, number 4. Published online July 25, 2019.

# **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor William Easterly who has offered me invaluable guidance and feedback during the completion of this honors capstone research project as my advisor, and to Professor Nan Xu who has provided insights and help on my research proposal and data analysis as my second reader. I want to thank our capstone program coordinators, Professor Marti Subrahmanyam, Professor Wendy Jin, and Professor Christina Wang, who have given me suggestions along the way and thank Xinyi Yang, who has helped to organize our assignments and program lectures. Also, I want to thank Professor Sukjoon Lee and Professor Xiangdong Qin who I have consulted while I was developing my proposal.

I’m very grateful to my family and friends for their support and companionship. Thank should go to Yihan Xu and Xilin Chen, my two friends in the same capstone program. We encouraged each other in the past year during the researching process. Lastly, I want to express my sincere appreciation for all the faculty members in the department of Economics at New York University Shanghai for their relentless support and extensive knowledge. Without the insights learned from their courses, I could not have finished this project.

1. Rivas, M. F. (2013). An experiment on corruption and gender. *Bulletin of Economic Research*, *65*(1), 10-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. World Bank. World Governance Indicators. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The developed countries from this dataset includes Switzerland, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, Germany, Austria, France, Canada, Belgium, Australia, Sweden, Italy, Iceland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, Spain, New Zealand, Greece, South Korea, Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Israel, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. This is based on the ranking from Human Development Index 2020 report. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)